This a brief note on semantical primtives as a follow up to the discussion of that today. Davidson says: "Let us call an expression a semantical primitive provided the rules which give the meaning for the sentences in which it does not appear do not suffice to determine the meaning of the sentences in which it does appear" (TMLL, p. 9).
I put it this way: an expression is a semantic primitive iff one can understand sentences in which it appears on the basis of understanding sentences in which it does not appear.
These are equivalent for the rules Davidson has in mind are those mastery of which suffices for understanding the sentences in question. If you can understand an expression on the basis of understanding sentences in which it does not appear, then that is because there are rules that apply to significant parts of it which appear in the other sentences and the mastery of which put one in a position to understand the expression in question, and so the expression in question is understood on the basis of understanding its parts and the mode of combination in it.
The primitive expressions are contrasted with complex expressions. A complex expression is one which is understood on the basis of understanding rules attaching to its parts (understood broadly, for example, tense inflection is relevant to meaning, so a tensed verb is not a semantical primitive). We can therefore also characterize a semantical primitive as a term that is not in this sense complex.
Why does Davidson put it the way he does? The answer is that (a) it is a very general way of putting it that does make any presuppositions about what sorts of devices can count as primitive in the relevant sense and (b) it is put in terms of rules attaching to (or understanding of) sentences and the meanings of words may be considered abstractions from sentence meaning.
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